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The Impact of the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5)
on Russian Foreign Policy1)
S. C. M. Paine
On the surface, Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) appears to be a struggle between
China and Japan for control over Korea. In reality, the overarching conflict was not
between Japan and China, but between Japan and Russia. Korea and Manchuria be-
came the battlefield while the Korean and Chinese governments became the main
casualties. Moreover, the war had three key consequences which were felt far beyond
the original belligerents. 1) The war would be the first act of a protracted struggle
between Japan and Russia to establish spheres of influence in the Far East, a struggle
which would continue unabated from the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) until it cul-
minated in a general Asian war in the 1930s. 2) Similarly, the realignment in the Far
Eastern balance of power at China’s expense caused by the Sino-Japanese War also
lasted until the end of World War II. 3) Finally, with this war, Korea became and has
remained a key international security concern.
The Sino-Japanese War has been a neglected war, almost completely overshad-
owed by the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. In fact, the Russo-Japanese War did not
change the balance of power in the Far East so much as it confirmed the result of the
Sino-Japanese War: Japan remained the dominant Asian power. While the first war
had made China a subject of international derision, the second war would make Rus-
sia the laughing stock of Europe. Given the prevailing prejudices of the times, Russia
would earn the ignominious distinction of becoming the first European power in mod-
ern times to suffer defeat at the hands of an Asian power.
Since the Sino-Japanese War has been relatively unstudied, particularly in terms of
Russia, before addressing the central concerns of this paper, there will be some gener-
al characterizations first about the Far Eastern situation and second, about the causes
of the war.
Background concerning the Sino-Japanese War
On the eve of the war, it was well-known in Europe that daunting internal problems
beset China. At mid-century a long period of rebellions had almost toppled the ruling
Ch’ing Dynasty; there had been an on-going devolution of central control from Pe-
king to the provinces; poverty remained endemic; and despite the promising signs at
the beginning of the so-called T’ung-chih Restoration (1862–74), the dynasty had
proven unable to adapt Confucian traditions to the new industrial world dawning on
China in the form of foreign demands for commerce on Western terms.2) Although
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there was a general awareness of these issues, Europeans did not question that China
remained the dominant power in the Far East. Meanwhile, the few Europeans who
were aware of Japan’s extensive political reforms of the 1880s generally reacted very
positively, but still without a sense that Japan was on the verge of supplanting China’s
international status. Therefore, Europeans were as shocked by the results of the Sino-
Japanese War as were the Chinese. The Japanese victory was so rapid and so com-
plete that the Chinese could not claim a single victory to their credit.
The situation in Korea had been unraveling for a number of years. In 1876, Japan
had tried to subject Korea to the kind of trading regime imposed by the West on
China; it compelled Korea to sign a treaty opening Korean ports to trade. China ob-
jected to such intrusions on its tributary and so began a two-decade-long struggle
between China and Japan for political influence over Korea. The struggle proved
highly destabilizing for the Korean government which disintegrated into competing
factions and for the royal family which split between the ex-regent (father of the
ruling king) versus the queen and her relatives.3) The ex-regent, the Taewongun, had
tried to have his daughter-in-law, Queen Min murdered in 1883. In response, the Chi-
nese kidnapped him and held him in China until 1885. For their part, the Japanese
seized the Korean royal palace two days before the war began and were involved in
the murder of Queen Min six months after the conclusion of the war in 1895. In 1896,
the widowed king would take up residence in the Russian legation for his own safe-
ty.4) Behind all this was the struggle between China, which wanted to restore tradi-
tional tributary ties with Korea and in a sense freeze Korea in time, and Japan, which
wanted to introduce political reforms in Korea, to modernize it, and, like the Europe-
ans elsewhere in Asia, reap the economic benefits.
Hostilities began on July 25, 1894 with the Japanese sinking of the Kowshing, a
British-owned ship being used to transport Chinese reinforcements to Korea. Three
days later, the Japanese defeated the Chinese at the Battle of Asan (July 28–9) on the
Korean coast. On August 1, Japan and China simultaneously declared war.5) Key Jap-
anese victories followed on September 15–6 at P’yongyang and a naval battle of the
Yellow Sea on September 17. At this time, the international press no longer consid-
ered a Chinese victory to be a foregone conclusion. On October 9, Japan drove the
Chinese out of Korea. Other Japanese victories followed on Chinese territory on Oc-
tober 25, at Hu-shan on the Yalu River and on November 6, at Chin-chou-ch’eng
along the Liao-tung Peninsula approaches to Port Arthur. The most important Japa-
nese victory of the war occurred with the rapid occupation of the modern fortifica-
tions at Port Arthur on November 21. After this, Chinese military capabilities lost all
credibility and the way to Peking lay open.
Japanese victories continued in Manchuria on December 6, at Fu-chou further up
the Liao-tung Peninsula; December 13, at Hai-ch’eng; and January 10, 1895 at Kai-
p’ing. On February 2, in a pincer movement on Peking, Japan took the port city of
Wei-hai-wei. With Port Arthur and Wei-hai-wei Japan controlled both shores of the
entry to the Gulf of Pei-chih-li. Simultaneously, Japanese troops started to move
15
south out of Manchuria. On March 6, they took Ying-k’ou, located at the mouth of the
Liao River. Then on March 20, 1895, peace negotiations began at Shimonoseki, Ja-
pan, where a peace treaty would be signed on April 17.6)
Overnight the perceived balance of power in the Far East had reversed itself.
Through the end of World War II, Japan and not China would be the dominant region-
al power. Since the Russian empire shared a long boundary with China and its Sakha-
lin Island was adjacent to Japan, the Russian government pondered the results of the
war very carefully. The second most directly affected European power was Britain,
which also evaluated the significance of the war. In both cases the war led to a redirec-
tion of foreign policy. In the case of Russia, it led to a fateful shift of Russian econom-
ic resources to focus on the development of Manchuria. In the case of Britain, the
increasing financial burdens entailed in maintaining its own empire combined with
the general perception of Japanese strength led Britain to enter into its only long-term
alliance with any power between 1815 and 1914, an alliance with Japan signed in
1902.7) Both of these changes then fed into the Russo-Japanese War.
The Causes of the Sino-Japanese War
Conventionally, the Sino-Japanese War has been portrayed as a conflict primarily
between China and Japan, while the triangular relationship including Russia has been
neglected. Most authors do make passing references to Japanese concerns about the
construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway begun in 1891; some point to the degener-
ating political situation in Korea, a land beset by even more internal problems than
China; a few even mention the issue of Anglo-Japanese treaty revision which would
put Japan on an equal legal footing with the European powers. But no one connects
these three items in order to explain the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.8) In fact,
they were inextricably linked.
Many members of the Japanese government believed that Korea represented the
cornerstone of Japanese national security. Some envisioned it as the focus for future
Japanese colonization — an outlet for Japan’s population surplus. Others saw eco-
nomic ties with Korea as essential to Japan’s internal economic development. Re-
gardless of this variation of opinion, in Japan there was overwhelming agreement that
foreign domination of Korea would pose a direct threat to Japan’s national security
and therefore had to be forestalled at all costs.
It has been generally recognized that China’s growing interference in Korean poli-
tics — a belated attempt to reinvigorate Korea’s flagging tributary relationship with
China — precipitated Japanese counter-measures, which then culminated in war.
Missing from this analysis has been a crucial link. Japan considered Chinese actions
threatening not because Japan feared Chinese dominance of Korea — at the time Chi-
na could not keep its own house in order let alone that of Korea. Rather, the danger lay
in the European power that would ultimately supplant China and thereby pose a life-
threatening national security threat to Japan. The Japanese government had no illu-
sions over which European power this would be . . . it would be Russia.
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To the Japanese government, the special imperial rescript of 1891 announcing the
Russian government’s intention to build a Trans-Siberian Railway amounted to a for-
eign policy manifesto on the order of the Monroe Doctrine. Just as the American
government had attempted to exclude other powers from the Americas, so, it seemed
to the Japanese, the Russians intended to keep Japan off the Asian mainland. In fact,
this was a perfectly correct assessment of Russian intentions, as was made clear after
the war by the Triple Intervention when Russia joined with Germany and France to
prevent Japanese occupation of the strategic Liao-tung Peninsula and its ports of
Dalien and Port Arthur.9)
The architect of the railway, Minister of Finance Count Sergei Iul’evich Witte,
confirmed this interpretation. At a meeting of Russian ministers held on April 11,
1895, Witte suggested “that the war launched by Japan is the consequence of the
construction of the Siberian Railway begun by us. All the European powers, and like-
wise even Japan, apparently, recognize that the partition of China will take place in
the not distant future, and [they] see in the Siberian railway a significant improvement
of our chances in the event of such a partition. The hostile actions of Japan are direct-
ed mainly against us.”10)
With the special imperial rescript of 1891 on the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Rus-
sian government had, in effect, indicated its intent to dominate Northeastern Asia.
Given Russia’s history of enforcing exclusionary zones along its borders and then
expanding those borders outward,11) Japan could foresee that if it took no action, it
would soon be excluded from Manchuria and Korea — the two areas on the mainland
considered most vital to its security. Once the general time-table for the completion of
the Trans-Siberian railway became known, Japan then had a deadline by which to
resolve the Korea problem. It had to do so before Russia could send troops by rail to
the Far East and thereby alter the balance of power in Asia. At the end of the war, a
front-page article in the newspaper, Moskovskie vedomosti alluded to this: “[O]ne of
the reasons for this haste by the Japanese was the incomplete construction of the Great
Siberian railway. It is absolutely clear that with its construction our interests on the
Pacific Ocean will be protected not only by more or less significant land and sea
forces, but likewise by the full power of the Russian people.”12) The implication was
that the railway posed an important security threat to Japan.
At the same time, Japan had been working on some very delicate treaty negotia-
tions with Britain. Like China, the European powers had subjected Japan to a number
of asymmetrical treaties granting Europeans various privileges. The Europeans had
justified this legal inequality on the grounds that China and Japan lacked the appropri-
ate legal and political institutions necessary for full legal reciprocity. The quest for
equal legal status became an important motive behind Japan’s Meiji-era reforms. In
1880 Japan promulgated a revised penal code and code of criminal procedure; in 1885
it established a cabinet system of government; in 1887 it instituted a Westernized
system of civil service examinations; in 1888 it established a Privy Council; in 1889 it
adopted a constitution; and in 1890 it convened its first Diet.13) Because of these re-
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forms, Britain recognized that Japan would soon fulfill the conditions required for the
full legal reciprocity which Europeans accorded one another, and the two countries
began negotiations that would end British extraterritoriality in Japan once Japan’s
new civil law code came into effect in 1899. This treaty set the precedent for similar
treaties with the other powers which were signed between 1894 and 1897.14)
Until the precedent-setting negotiations with Britain were completed, Japan could
ill-afford any foreign adventures which might threaten its quest for legal equality.
Once these negotiations were completed in July of 1894, however, Japan had a short
window of opportunity to settle matters in Korea before completion of the Trans-
Siberian Railway, when Korea might be irretrievably lost to a power far more threat-
ening than the imploding Ch’ing Dynasty. Within the month the war had begun.
The Russians were among the first to realize that Japan’s victory over China
marked a pivotal event in Asian history. The importance that they attached to this
became evident after the war with the rapid redirection of Russian government funds
to Manchuria in order to build railway lines which would make Russia owner of by
far the largest concessions in China. The amount of funds involved were massive.
Their magnitude demonstrated the seriousness of Russia’s post-war reappraisal of the
Far Eastern situation.
Russian press reports made during the war clearly document the rapid evolution of
Russian perceptions of the Far Eastern situation. Week by week, Russian attitudes
changed, initially, about the probable outcome of the war, then about the relative
power of belligerents, and later about the security ramifications for the Russian em-
pire. Before the outbreak of hostilities on July 25, 1894, the newspaper coverage of
the brewing hostilities over Korea was very scanty. With the rapid succession of Jap-
anese victories, however, the Russian press took note, and both article frequency and
length increased.
Simultaneously, the focus of these articles changed rapidly from a presumption of
Chinese victory to an abrupt about-face recognition of Japan’s suddenly obvious
power. After the death of Alexander III on November 1, 1894, newspaper coverage
understandably focused on the funeral preparations for the deceased monarch and the
ascension to the throne of his son. By this time, the Russian press had already taken
for granted the defeat of China — the Japanese victories which continued after the
death of Alexander were no longer unexpected events. Therefore, there was a long
hiatus in Russian newspaper coverage of the war which lasted until the peace treaty
negotiations once more brought the matter to the fore.
These changes in Russian perceptions followed three general stages. First, there
was a reversal in estimations of the relative power of China and Japan. Japan sup-
planted China as the internationally recognized dominant power of the Far East. Sec-
ond, this was followed by a recognition that the balance of power in the Far East had
changed. Finally, the Russians concluded that Japanese ascendancy in the Far East
would pose a growing security threat to Russia’s easternmost possessions. Each of
these three stages will be discussed in turn.
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Reversal in the Perceptions of China relative to Japan
At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, Russian views favored China over
Japan. The Journal de St-Pétersbourg, a French-language paper published by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,15) regarded Japanese foreign policy as a consequence of
political instability within the Diet: “[I]n Japan they have resorted to the usual remedy
of a weak government — they have started a foreign war.”16) Although the same arti-
cle noted that the Japanese army, in contrast to the Chinese army, had been organized
on the European model, it emphasized the overwhelming potential numerical superi-
ority of Chinese troops.17) Another article extolled: “Firmness and persistence are spe-
cial qualities of the Chinese race and justify its superior role in the history of human-
ity.”18) Although Chinese political weakness was recognized, the same editorialist
ventured: “We believe in how important its military and economic resources will
soon be: agriculture, industry, commerce, armies, naval forces.”19) Various articles
emphasized that the war would be a long one.20) The one newspaper which early on
ventured that Japanese military forces were superior to those of China did so in the
most tentative way — an indication of how widely accepted the presumption of Chi-
nese military superiority was.21)
One of the earliest newspapers to devote serious articles to Japan was the St. Pe-
tersburg daily, Novoe vremiia, one of the best-known conservative newspapers.22) It
shared the prevailing assumptions that Japan was just another backward Asian coun-
try: It italicized the sentence: “The Japanese cannot regenerate themselves, although
sometimes they strive for this.” The same article was even more negative about the
Chinese: “The Chinese never will never regenerate themselves and they do not want
this.”23) Despite such prejudices, in an article published on August 6, 1984, less than
two weeks after the start of the war, Novoe vremiia provided a detailed comparison of
the Chinese and Japanese navies. It concluded that the Japanese navy was superior.24)
Less than a month after the onset of hostilities, Journal de St-Pétersbourg reported
that Japan had become the master of the seas due the “inertia of the Chinese navy.”25)
By the end of August, it would no longer be devoting long or positive feature stories
to China but to Japan.26)” The Japanese naval administration can bear perfectly the
comparison with a European navy, equally well in what concerns the vessels as in the
officers and in the equipment. . . . the army of the mikado is the only military force in
the Far East set up according to European methods.”27) By the first of September, the
Journal de St-Pétersbourg was waxing:28)
All the world knows about the efforts made by Japan to assimilate the progress of our European
societies; but what is less well known is that our civilization has been grafted onto a very remark-
able indigenous civilization, having numerous traits in common with ours, all of it being much more
ancient. Only this can explain the rapidity with which the Japanese have put themselves on a par
with western civilization and the astonishing progress without historical precedent, which have
characterized this transformation.
By the end of the year, the Moscow newspaper, Russkie vedomosti, captured the new
prevailing stereotypes concerning the belligerents: Korea was described as being
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weak, little-cultured and peaceful; China was credited for being enormous but poorly
united, largely immobile, and conservative; whereas Japan was enterprising and ener-
getic, with a rapidly developing culture, with proud pretensions, and with great forces
on the land and sea.29) This represented a 180-degree change from the perceptions
about the relative strength of China and Japan prevailing at the start of the war.
Change in the Balance of Power
Within two weeks of the outbreak of the war, Novoe vremiia was among the first
newspapers to point out that the war would undoubtedly change the status quo in the
Far East.30) Two weeks later it expanded on this theme by summarizing the press
accounts of the other interested European powers.31) Implicitly, it recognized that the
Sino-Japanese War had international implications. Other Russian newspapers would
pick up this theme later on. For instance, two months after the outbreak of hostilities,
Moskovskie vedomosti recognized that the international situation in the Far East had
changed as a result of the on-going war: “Japan has acquired that status of an impor-
tant eastern power for which she had been striving. Russia will have to change her
attitude of quiet waiting to another one not lacking in anxiety.”32) The article went on
to speculate on the possible fall of the Ch’ing Dynasty.33)
With two key Chinese defeats, similar observations became general throughout the
press. The Chinese defeat at P’yongyang (September 15–16, 1894) followed a day
later by its naval defeat in the Yellow Sea34) (September 17, 1894) dazzled the press.
No one had suspected such a rapid turn of events. S.-Peterburgskie vedomosti credit-
ed Japan with “a brilliant victory.”35) Within the month, the Japanese would expel the
Chinese from Korea (October 9, 1894) and start taking the strategic land and naval
approaches to Peking. In early October, the Moscow newspaper, Russkie vedomosti
observed: “The war which has flared up between China and Japan, indisputably is
important not only for the Asiatic East, but also for Europe, and in particular for
Russia, whose Asiatic possessions border on Korea and China and are located not far
distant from the possessions of Japan.”36) After the battle at the Yellow Sea, it was
recognized that Japan controlled the sea.37) Thereafter Moskovskie vedomosti treated
an ultimate Japanese victory as a foregone conclusion: “Our readers who were famil-
iar with the condition of the Chinese and Japanese military forces before the war,
undoubtedly are not surprised by the victories of the sons of ‘the Empire of the Rising
Sun,’ and should have expected them. . . . there is no doubt that a new strong military
power has appeared in the east.”38)
China’s miserable performance had shattered the pre-war illusion of its military
power. The Imperial Academy of Science’s S.-Peterburgskie vedomosti39) was one of
the only newspapers to publish articles consistently critical of the Chinese military. In
August it quoted The Times of London as printing that “. . . China does not have one,
not simply outstanding, but even just able general.”40) That same month S.-Peterburg-
skie vedomosti noted that the Chinese military did not provide any organized medical
care.41) With such a prominent victory, the rest of the Russian press finally followed
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suit with a stream of articles concerning the endemic problems in the Chinese army
and navy.42) These problems included a lack of training and discipline; cowardice
pervading all ranks; and rampant insubordination, desertion, and corruption. Time
and time again, Chinese officers and troops fled their posts. Time and time again
Chinese forces allowed quantities of valuable military supplies to fall into Japanese
hands instead of destroying them before retreating.43) The Chinese military proved
itself incompetent in the field against combatants and dangerous to non-combatants
whom it preyed upon. According to Moskovskie vedomosti, “The people fear Chinese
soldiers much more than the invasion by the Japanese.”44) Not only did Chinese de-
feats destroy China’s image in the eyes of the Europeans, but the Chinese govern-
ments lies minimizing their magnitude undermined any vestiges of credibility.45)
The mortal blow to Chinese military prestige came with Japan’s rapid capture of
the modern defenses at Dalien and Port Arthur (Nov. 21, 1894). These fortifications
should have been very difficult to dislodge since they were well-situated, up-to-date,
and amply supplied with modern equipment. Yet Chinese officials fled, Chinese
troops fought poorly, and once again the Chinese did not manage to destroy the
fortifications or munitions before the Japanese took them.46) China’s reputation for
military incompetence was cemented. With the fall of Port Arthur: “The path to Pe-
king is now open for the Japanese.”47)
Prior to the war, China had been treated as venerable civilization albeit a power
past its prime. After the war, this former respect turned into derision.48) According to
the Journal de St-Pétersbourg:49)
Since the beginning of this war, the Chinese have provided a lamentable spectacle. No one suspect-
ed such weakness [or] an equally complete want of foresight . . . Japan vanquisher of China! . . . It
is remarkable — and this alone is sufficient to prove the complete absence of any Chinese resis-
tance — that this war, which has been going on for four months, has only caused the Japanese
armies insignificant losses, scarcely one thousand men killed, as many in Korea as at sea and during
the advance on Port Arthur! . . . China has no military organization whatsoever. . . . The Japanese,
in contrast, have resolutely begun a war European style.
By early January, Japanese military achievements had received recognition through-
out the European press. The Japanese army had been given credit for mastering the
Chinese despite the difficult terrain in Korea and Manchuria.50) In short, there was a
general recognition that the military balance of power in the Far East had changed.
Growing Russian Security Concerns
As the Russians began to appreciate Japan’s strength, they soon began to fear that
Japan might pose a security threat to Russian interests. Specifically they feared that
Japan would seek to establish its hegemony in the Far East.51) Two weeks after the
opening of hostilities, S.-Peterburgskie vedomosti suggested that Korea had provided
Japan with the pretext to demonstrate to the world the success of its recent domestic
reforms, to show off its modern military, and to seek hegemony in the Far East.52)
Initial Russian admiration for Japanese military prowess would soon degenerate into
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anti-Japanese diatribes.53) Growing anti-Japanese sentiments would be one of the con-
sequences of the Sino-Japanese War. In the ensuing years, they would develop into
fears of an impending “yellow peril” and would become widespread, a decade later,
during the Russo-Japanese War.
Moskovskie vedomosti was among the first newspapers to advance a more sinister
interpretation of Japanese motives. It attributed the rapidity of Japan’s military suc-
cesses to Japanese plans made three years previously to take Korea: “Such speed was
only possible because everything had been prepared beforehand.”45) Within the week
it changed this time frame from three years to “from time immemorial the Japanese
have harbored pretensions to Korea. . . . Their goal consists in the seizure of power in
Korea.”55) It went on to highlight the hypocrisy of Japanese actions, by juxtaposing
Japan’s forcible interference in Korean affairs to Japan’s jealous protection of its own
internal affairs from European interference.56)
Novoe vremiia in an article entitled, “The Yellow War and Its Consequences,”
warned: “[W]e look, with true alarm, at the emergence of a new world power thirty
hours by sea from Vladivostok.” The article continued:57)
[O]f course the strengthening of Japan at the expense of China scares us and makes us carefully
consider our own military forces in the Amur region, the way it was before the emergence there of
a new world power in the form of a Japan triumphant on land and sea. Military glory and success in
battle are too capable of intoxicating even old states, and because of this ability to intoxicate to the
point of losing all prudence, one should fear a young state which has only just stepped out in the role
of an enlightener, and in part, perhaps, of a liberator of the numerous kindred yellow tribes of the
East.
The article expressed concerns of an incipient pan-mongolism. It concluded: “[T]he
yellows are fighting; the whites must keep a sharp look out!”
Russkie vedomosti published one of the clearest descriptions of the brewing
conflict between Russian and Japanese aspirations:58)
Korea, Manchuria and part of China — all of this must be the historical sphere of influence of the
Japanese, who, by their geographic location and ethnographic make-up have a greater right to these
areas than any other people, and even more so than a newly arrived people alien to East Asia, such
as all the European peoples. Of these peoples — the Russians appear, from the point of view of the
Japanese chauvinists, to have the fewest rights of all to the domination of East Asia; meanwhile the
possessions of Russia have approached Korea itself; a Russian port has sprung up on the shores of
the Sea of Japan; and the Siberian Railway, which is under construction, demonstrates the aspira-
tions of Russia to link this great region more firmly to the central state and to strengthen Russian
influence and trade in the Sino-Japanese region. But such aspirations run counter to the ideas and
plans of the Japanese, and therefore — dream Japanese politicians — the Empire of the Rising Sun
must take measures, while it is not too late, in order to guarantee its predominance in the closest
parts of the east Asiatic continent and to strengthen its situation vis-a-vis Russia. As soon this is
successful, it will not be — so they think — particularly difficult to appear more decisive even
against the aggressive aspirations of Russia, even take from her the Ussuri region and throw her out
of eastern Siberia. Asia should belong to the peoples of Asia and the natural eastern border of
Russia is the Ural Mountains.
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The Russians feared that should the Japanese establish themselves in either Korea or
Manchuria, the next objective would be to expel the Russians from eastern Siberia. In
fact, during the 1920s and 1930s, this idea did cross Japanese minds on more than one
occasion, first during the Russian Civil War and then again in the late 1930s.
In early 1895, security concerns were widespread in the Russian press. Articles
began appearing which demanded that Japan be prevented from securing territory on
the Asian mainland.59) Others went further. Prince Esper Esperevich Ukhtomskii’s
ideas about the east had been shaped several years before the Sino-Japanese War; at
that time, he had accompanied then-tsarevich Nicholas on a tour of the Far East when
a Japanese national had wounded Nicholas in an assassination attempt made in Ja-
pan.60) Ukhtomskii devoted a long article in Moskovskie vedomosti to the impending
Japanese (and continuing British) threat to Russian interests in the Far East.61)
To resolve these new security concerns, there were soon calls for the acquisition of
an ice-free port in the Far East. At that time the port of Vladivostok froze over for
about four months each winter, limiting its military usefulness. Russkie vedomosti
boldly stated: “It is not necessary even to mention the necessity of such a port, it is
obvious in and of itself. . . .”62) The article went on to recommend that such an ice-free
port become the terminus for the Trans-Siberian Railway. The solution to Russia’s
security concerns would be territorial expansion. This did not take place in the man-
ner suggested by this article, but, as the Japanese had foreseen, the Trans-Siberian
Railway did indeed have security ramifications aimed directly at them. An article
written in the same newspaper less than a week later was closer to the mark when it
recommended that the Trans-Siberian Railway be run directly across Manchuria,
which was exactly what ended up happening.63)
By the closing months of the war, the Russian press had reached the conclusion that
Japan now posed a serious security threat to Russia and that expansion of Russia’s Far
Eastern railway system had become a necessary preemptive measure. Once the terms
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, such as the Japanese occupation of the strategic Liao-
tung Peninsula, became known, such security concerns received front-page coverage.
In late April and early May, Moskovskie vedomosti featured a series of long articles
entitled, “Complications in the Far East,” by an anonymous author who went by the
title: “not a diplomat.” These articles detailed the strategic implications of Japan’s
victory and provided summaries of contemporary British, French, German, and
American press accounts.64) One French newspaper cited pointed out that the war had
changed the balance of power in the Far East.65) “The truth is that Japan will demand
as the prize for its victories some economic advantages which will give it a certain
monopoly.”66) One formerly pro-Japanese French columnist reported: “Evidently,
from the European point of view, this development of Japan, a people which was
considered a negligible quantity and which shows itself invading, cannot but give rise
to some anxieties or at least some reflections. If Europe wants to protect its position in
the world, it must desire to act with a certain unity vis-a-vis the peoples reputed to be
barbarian and to form a kind of syndicate.”67) The general conclusion of such articles
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was that Russia must redouble efforts to colonize Russian Far Eastern territories and
to speed up the completion of the Trans-Siberial Railway.68) Simultaneously, it must
shore up its Far Eastern defenses.
Consequences of the War
The consequences of the first Sino-Japanese war for China are well known. This is
probably the most studied aspect of the war in English-language books on the subject.
China’s rapid defeat discredited the Ch’ing Dynasty both at home and abroad. Like
the Russians, the Chinese had deep-rooted prejudices about other Asians. They re-
served special prejudices for the Japanese, whom they considered an upstart people,
who had better turn their minds back to the Chinese classics rather than wreak havoc
on the Asian mainland. To get a sense of the prevailing prejudices, the Chinese, in
official communications, routinely referred to the Japanese as wako¯ (倭冠)or midget
pirates. To the Chinese, the ruling Manchu Dynasty appeared derelict in its duty as
guardians of Han China. To foreigners, China seemed ripe for the taking and the so-
called scramble for concessions immediately ensued. In 1897 Germany took the port
of Ch’ing-tao while Russia took Port Arthur and Dalien. In 1898 Britain took Wei-
hai-wei and the New Territories, while France took Kuang-chou Bay. The political
situation in China was coming unglued.
In the case of Japan, it had tasted the first fruits of modernization with the realiza-
tion of phase one of its unfolding ambitions in Asia. Its newspapers were euphoric at
the conclusion of the war but quickly soured with the success of the Triple Interven-
tion. This left a deep-seated Japanese bitterness directed at Russia. Such anger would
be vented a decade later at Russia’s expense, when Japan defeated Russia and secured
not only the Liao-tung Peninsula but also the southernmost section of Russia’s exten-
sive and costly railway concessions in Manchuria.
Similarly, on the Russian side, the Sino-Japanese War led to a rapid acceleration of
Russian colonization and development schemes for Manchuria. The anonymous au-
thor of the series, “Complications in the Far East” had concluded quite prophetically
as it turned out: “[O]ne must be concerned that the Japanese will strengthen their
armaments by that billion francs which they will receive in the form of war indemni-
ty, in order to take vengeance on us in the future for our interference in the Sino-
Japanese quarrel.”69) That was indeed what happened. Japan used its war indemnity
from China to fund a major armaments program. Russian attempts to shore up its Far
Eastern defenses would inspire Japanese counter-measures, leading to an arms race70)
in the Far East which would culminate in the Russo-Japanese War.
For China, the primary victim along with Korea, the war had set in motion a most
detrimental cascade of events ultimately precipitating action and reaction which cul-
minated in the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–45. In 1895, the same prescient anony-
mous author also predicted that Japan would eventually try to invade Europe. “If [we]
do not stop Japan now, then this invasion must be expected not in 1895 but in
1945.”71) Even if he did not peg the location of the invasion (Japan would take over
24
most of Asia not Europe), he was not so far off on the timing. For all of these reasons,
the neglected Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 was portentous indeed.
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